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By this time, the system of state collaboration at all levels and the smoothly functioning exploitation of the French police for the persecution of the Jews were already things of the past.
But the Germans had planned it, and without the presence of the German Wehrmacht it would never have materialized. Moreover, it would be pointless to ignore the particular lessons to be learned from that interaction.
The present analysis reveals how power and morality were interlinked in the developing relations between perpetrators and collaborators and how morally indifferent collaborators and even ruthless perpetrators could be forced to acknowledge the power of morality once the latter gained momentum both in circles close to the regime and in public opinion.
Also of importance was the extended preparatory phase of the military strategy in Western Europe. This preparation, also as regards the occupation administration, was largely under the control of the Wehrmacht.
In this regard, the latter worked closely with experts of the civilian Reich administration. The main purpose was to mobilize the economic power of the occupied territories for German purposes.
Although the Wehrmacht also exercised administrative functions in the rear military areas in the war against the Soviet Union in Serbia, Greece, and North Africa , it did so there under completely different conditions of an occupation situation defined primarily in military terms.
Both the influence exerted by Himmler on appointments to the upper echelons of the administration in the Netherlands and his repeated attempts to have a civil administration with an HSSPF established in Belgium indicate that he was well aware of the relative weakness of his position.
The persecution of the Jews in Western Europe from to followed the pattern of institution building and progressive escalation established in Germany proper, in Austria, and in the Nazi-established Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
These measures were followed by deportation and extermination. This was due, in the first instance, to the internal contradictions of German policy toward the countries concerned.
These contradictions not only brought to light conflicts between the German actors but also broadened the scope for action of the domestic actors.
Both factors had ambivalent repercussions for the persecution of the Jews. The supposition that the power enjoyed by the SS and police apparatus in particular had profound repercussions for the persecution of the Jews is trivial.
It is indeed evident that the initial position created by the respective occupation regimes for the SS and Gestapo to enforce the persecution measures, at least in the area of police repression, was of supreme importance.
Under these conditions, a vertical and a horizontal axis of power sharing emerged. If the aim was to husband German resources and to mobilize domestic resources on a sustainable basis, the German occupier also had to share the power, to a certain extent, with the home authorities.
In the horizontal axis, by contrast, in the relations of German actors among themselves, power rivalries developed of the kind that also marked the National Socialist system of rule in the Reich.
The multidimensional character of the division of power in the occupied territories of Western Europe granted the key players considerable leeway for action, which they sought, to different extents, to exploit for their own purposes and goals.
Even though these purposes and goals may have followed a general line as was undoubtedly the case with the persecution of the Jews , they were heterogeneous and volatile when it came to specifics.
These contradictions would have inevitably led to substantial problems in the occupation policy even if, in other respects, the German side had had clear strategic concepts for dealing with the occupied territories and unambiguous regulations regarding competences.
But there was no such clarity. This could not fail to lead to permanent incoherence in the occupation policy. This was astonishing for contemporaries in the case of a regime that had the aura of a tightly run dictatorship and an effective administration.
What relative weights should be accorded to these goals and how these overall objectives should best be accomplished, however, remained objects of internal disputes.
The individual branches of power could mobilize the support of central Reich authorities or of leading representatives of the regime, including Hitler himself, on a case-by-case basis.
However, heterogeneous ideological fronts and interests developed here too, depending not least on the course of the war and hence on the German power potential in Europe.
A fundamental line of conflict was that between those who regarded collaboration with the German occupying power and those who regarded passive or active resistance as the appropriate strategy in the struggle to promote national interests.
Precisely analogous to relations on the German side, the collaborators included ideologues and pragmatists, depending on whether the individuals concerned believed they should cooperate with the Germans on ideological grounds or for reasons of expediency.
Under these conditions, a stable axis of cooperation was most likely to develop between the pragmatists on both sides.
This cooperation was threatened by the incoherence of the occupation policy on the German side and, naturally, by the organized resistance on the side of the occupied countries.
Both factors were destined to destabilize the cooperative relations as the war persisted. In the occupied western territories, the expansion and intensification of the German war economy from the first half of onward23 led to an increased demand for labor and to more immediate interventions in the national economies concerned.
In addition, there was progressive deterioration of the military position of the Reich from the fall of onward. These two factors reduced the willingness of the ideologically indifferent forces in the occupied countries to collaborate and strengthened the willingness of the opposition forces to engage in active resistance.
With this, there could be no real question of power-sharing relations, at least in the vertical axis. Like the rule of the National Socialist regime in the Reich proper, the final phase of the occupation was marked by a surge in coercion, violence, and terror in Western Europe.
The systematic execution of the anti-Jewish policy was initiated in the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in the fall of The sequence of persecution measures and related stages of radicalization until the spring of corresponded, in essence, to those in the Reich until the onset of the mass deportations in the fall of This development took a more or less homogeneous course in Western Europe.
However, there were profound differences in how the enforcing authorities were established, both in comparison to the Reich and among the three Western European countries.
These differences, in turn, had lasting repercussions for the actual enforcement of the persecution. Already in the Reich, the authorities charged with enforcing the persecution of the Jews were centralized in varying degrees.
The police side of the persecution was under the direction of the Reich Security Main Office and was implemented by the regional and local agencies of the Gestapo under its direct control.
The SS and police authorities strove to realize this centralization also in the occupied Western European countries, though they met with very uneven success there.
In the Netherlands, supreme police authority lay with the German general commissioner for security, who was simultaneously HSSPF and hence embodied the principle of the amalgamation of party organizations SS, SD and state police realized in the Reich Security Main Office and claimed the authority to issue directions to the Dutch police.
In Belgium, the police authority resided with the military commander, hence the Wehrmacht, until July In fact, one cannot assume that a linear relation existed between a more pronounced hierarchization of the occupation administration and a greater centrality of the SS and Gestapo in the occupation system, on the one hand, and the level of implementation of the intentions to persecute the Jews, on the other.
If the Reich Security Main Office succeeded in making the latter, through glaring deficiencies in domestic and military security and political stability, look incompetent in the eyes of the upper echelons of the regime if possible, of Hitler himself , it could hope for an increase in authority and power.
This tactic would succeed at least in the Netherlands and France. In the Netherlands, political strikes in February lead to a strengthening of the position of the SS and Gestapo apparatus as regards competences in the persecution of the Jews; in France, through attacks on Paris synagogues in October , the SS provoked heightened tensions that ultimately resulted in the appointment of an HSSPF in May In the area of the economic persecution of the Jews, the competences were already spread over different administrative areas in Germany proper.
The most important authorities, aside from the apparatus of the SS and Gestapo, were the so-called regional economic advisers Kreiswirtschaftsberater of the NSDAP, the financial administration and the plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan.
At this time, the efforts of the SS leadership to concentrate competences in both the police and the economic persecution of the Jews in Germany proper were focused primarily on the plundering of the Jews in connection with the emigration.
The regular occupation administrations did not allow their competences in the economic domain to be withdrawn, even where the Jews were concerned the plundering of the Jews by the Gestapo in the immediate context of the arrests and deportations remained unaffected by this, of course.
This reflected the primacy of the general occupation policy, whose overall objective focused on the economic exploitation of the occupied territories.
The extent to which tasks and hence also power were divided between the German and the home authorities in the domain of the economic persecution of the Jews varied even more than in that of the persecution through police repression.
As a French institution on Belgian territory, the latter was subject to the enemy assets administration and, as a result, enabled the occupier to exercise more direct control by comparison with the Brussels Trust.
In France, by contrast, jurisdiction for the persecution of the Jews in the economic area was entirely under French control.
This division corresponded to the directives given to the German negotiators by Hitler, who accorded priority over other occupation policy considerations to the enduring split in the alliance between France and England.
Of decisive importance in the case of a continuation of the war against England, according to Hitler, were the loyalty of the French colonies toward a mother country that had withdrawn from the war and, for this reason, the existence of a French government as a sovereign entity with its own territory.
As heads of the civilian administration, they were in charge of the entire administration in the civilian area, which amounted to an annexation.
After the Allied landing in North Africa on 8 November , the Wehrmacht took control of large areas of the Free Zone by 12 November The first military governor of Paris, which was occupied by German troops on 14 June , was General Alfred von Vollard-Bockelberg, followed from 30 June by General Alfred Streccius as head of the military administration.
Under the authority of the military commander were a command staff to lead the occupation troops and an administrative staff.
Typical of the practice of military posting, the leadership of the command staff was subject to greater fluctuation than that of the administrative staff.
Between and , the command staff was led by five successive high-level officers Auleb, Speidel, Kossmann, Linstow, and Krause , of whom the future supreme commander of the NATO troops in Europe, Hans Speidel, is the most important figure historically.
Bearer of the Gold Honor Party Badge Goldenes Parteiabzeichen , Schmid could count as the representative of the NSDAP in the military administration in Paris.
Both the German and the French sides maintained the legal fiction that the armistice of 22 June was itself not affected by the expansion of German and Italian military presence in southeastern France.
The map depicts, accordingly, both the demarcation line between the northern and the southern zones and the thinner line demarcating the expanded Italian occupation zone that existed between 11 November and 8 September , when the Italian armed forces surrendered to the Allies.
A reckless manhunt for the Jews in the previous Italian occupation zone followed when the Germans took control. Copyright Bundesarchiv.
The administrative staff was subdivided into the Administration Section and the Economics Section. From August to June , the Administration Section was led by Dr.
Franz Medicus, who assumed responsibility in September for the administrative group with the quartermaster general in the Army High Command and later coordinated the reporting of the deactivation staffs.
From September to August , the Administration Section was led by Dr. Wilhelm Gustav Ermert. Throughout the occupation, the Economics Section was under the direction of Dr.
Elmar Michel, who, as mentioned, headed the entire administrative staff in personal union from August onward. Group 1, General Affairs and De-jewification, of Subsection Wi I, under chief military administrative counselor Dr.
Kurt Blanke, played a central role in the economic measures against the Jews. Nestler estimates that the total number of people working for German bodies in France, exclusive of the occupying troops, was 80, Following this pattern, on the day Paris was captured, 14 June , the Reich foreign minister appointed the former collaborator of his Ribbentrop Bureau, Otto Abetz, as the plenipotentiary accredited to the military commander in Paris.
In fact, it played an active role in launching the persecution of the Jews and its ceaseless radicalization. The relevant embassy employees in this connection were embassy counselor Dr.
The foreign minister was initially Paul Baudouin, to be succeeded on 27 October by Laval, who was himself dismissed as vice president and foreign minister on 13 December In April , Laval returned to power with expanded competences.
The relative autonomy and capacity for political action of the home officials and the political and ideological upheaval in the country set the occupation, governmental, and administrative relations in France apart fundamentally from those in Belgium and the Netherlands.
This ideological orientation acquired its dynamic from the fact that it identified the supposed causes of the catastrophe of June It went along with the fear of foreign infiltration, whether because of an assumed dilution of French culture and identity or because of assumed threats to public security or adverse demographic developments.
On the other hand, the logic of exclusion, as precisely formulated by Duverger see n. This issue linkage prepared the ground for all of the measures against the Jews up to the deportations to the extermination camps.
Through the argumentative linkage with the public interest, the measures against the Jews could assume the character of justified measures that could be the taken for granted.
Here the common sense of the political and administrative elites of Vichy found its counterpart in that of the German military administration. The discrimination and persecution measures were facilitated by this common sense.
These measures had nothing in common with the extermination plans of the National Socialist government in Germany. Nevertheless, its genocidal plans could connect seamlessly with such preparations.
Through a pro-German stance in different variants, the French side hoped, in the long term, to ensure that the status of France would be respected in a postwar Europe dominated by Germany and, in the short term, to secure an improvement in some important areas of domestic policy, particularly a speeding up of the return of the prisoners of war, an easing of travel and trade between the occupied and free zones, and, not least, a strengthening of administrative autonomy, including that of the police.
On 11 November , Hitler observed, in his Directive No. The latter measure was contentious even on the German side, because of the negative repercussions on public opinion and the willingness to collaborate in France.
The efforts of Vichy officials to prove the seriousness of their collaboration efforts became even more intensive. Moreover, the incident helped to ensure that Laval enjoyed an outstanding key position in relations between Germany and France after his return to power in April At the beginning of the German occupation of France, these consisted of just a single bureau of the Security Service Sicherheitsdienst, or SD that enjoyed nothing more than observer status, which was indicative of the initially relatively weak position of the Reich Security Main Office in the Western European territories.
The insignificant SD bureau in Paris took instructions from Brussels, where a special task force was established under the physician Dr.
Max Thomas, in his capacity as representative of the chief of the Security Police and Security Service for Belgium and France,2 to whom the agencies in both Brussels and Paris reported.
Helmut Knochen, senior commander of the Security Police and the SD in France from Knochen was thus formally answerable to the representative of the commander of the Security Police and the SD Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, or BdS for France and Belgium, Thomas, who was officially based in both Brussels and Paris.
The general competence for all security and police affairs lay in the hands of the military commander. He arrived in Paris in September and reported directly to the head of Department IV B 4 in the Reich Security Main Office, Adolf Eichmann.
A conflict broke out between him and Knochen in the summer of , because Dannecker dealt directly with the French police stations and, when attempting to put some of them under pressure, paid no heed to the overall direction of occupation policy in the area of policing, which, meanwhile, was based on negotiated agreements between the German and French police leadership rather than on hierarchical order and obedience.
In the meantime, the preconditions for the collaboration were also favorable on the French side. Between June and August , Oberg, Knochen, and Bousquet conducted intensive negotiations aimed at achieving a compromise between collaboration in security matters and protecting French administrative autonomy.
Among the most horrifying episodes of the collaboration, however, was the deportation in August of several thousands of Jewish children, most of whom were separated from their parents and, after weekslong stopovers in French camps, were transported in cattle wagons to Auschwitz, where, without exception, they were murdered in the gas chambers immediately upon arrival.
The representatives of the Reich Security Main Office were involved only peripherally. Nevertheless, from the fall of at the latest, economic and repressive police persecution measures would be closely intermeshed.
In the measures to be taken against the Jews in the economic domain, two aspects are decisive. First, we must do what is necessary to ensure that the elimination of Jews [from the economy] endures even after the occupation.
Furthermore, the German side cannot provide sufficient manpower to deal with the great number of Jewish enterprises.
Both of these considerations have led us to involve the French authorities in the elimination of Jews. This will ensure that the French authorities share the responsibility and that the French administrative apparatus can be employed.
Assuming that important German interests are not involved, therefore, French provisional administrators will also be used in the first instance.
In principle, the aim will be to replace the Jews by French so that the French population also benefits economically from the elimination of the Jews and to avoid the impression that only the Germans want to take the place of the Jews.
This approach involves the danger that lower-level officials will not perform the tasks assigned to them with the necessary zeal, out of a lack of conviction.
Therefore, the task of the German military administration authorities will be to supervise and monitor carefully the activity of the French authorities in this regard.
The right of the administrateurs provisoires to liquidate Jewish enterprises was explicitly confirmed by law on 2 February When it came to the midsize and larger enterprises, the German military administration headquarters in Paris was in charge.
The body was divided into eight sections, each devoted to a particular economic sector. In the first half of , at least the administrateurs provisoires for the midsize and larger enterprises were still selected and appointed either by the prefects or directly by the administration of the military commander.
In France, there could be no question of such a central authority under German direction, because of the guarantee of French administrative sovereignty in the Armistice Convention.
The CGQJ had two headquarters, one in Vichy and one in Paris. It was answerable to the interior minister from April to May , then directly to the head of government from May The CGQJ serves as an example both of the tensions and contradictions within the multidimensional division of powers in the interplay between the German occupying power and the Vichy regime and of the action orientations of those concerned.
The comparison with the conditions in Belgium, where the planned Commissariat royal aux questions juives did not come about,18 makes this obvious.
On the other hand, the CGQJ was nevertheless established under German pressure and, as such, was an indication of latent interference by the occupying power in French administrative affairs.
Finally, the assignment of competence to the CGQJ triggered rivalries with the already established authorities, particularly with the SCAP and the regular Vichy ministries.
Copyright Agence Roger Viollet. This was true of the newly created MPI. Bichelonne and Bousquet each had a German counterpart in the person of comparably young and unscrupulous Nazi functionaries.
In the area of the economy and the collaboration in mobilizing workforces for the German armaments industry, this counterpart was Albert Speer.
From the French perspective, the question arose again concerning the integrity of the national administrative structures. From the German perspective, neither the occupied zone nor the Free Zone had a functioning administrative apparatus for implementing the economic measures against the Jews in the spring of By a law of 19 June , the SCAP was integrated into the CGQJ.
The remaining 10 percent was used to finance the CGQJ. Through a government ordinance of 21 March ,30 the UGIF was then authorized to draw upon the frozen accounts at the CDC to repay the credit.
In the final analysis, therefore, the so-called fine lent further impetus to the radicalization of the economic persecution measures directed against the Jews.
It ensured that the spoliation of Jewish property by the state was firmly institutionalized, particularly through the close cooperation between state authorities and banks.
In the final stage, these efforts of the French side ran parallel to the plans by the SD and the Gestapo to initiate the systematic mass deportations of Jews from France and to the streamlining of the organizational preconditions through the appointment of Oberg as HSSPF in May and the promotion of Knochen to BdS.
The primary issue for all of those concerned was instead a political one. On the German side in , the objective of the deportation of all Jews was a directive from the very highest level.
That was sufficient as motivation for the persecutors and as an argument toward the French authorities. Therefore, the prehistory of the mass deportations that began in June is, above all, proof of the political capabilities of the SS.
Both of these facts were primarily due to a Franco-German consensus among the professional police technocrats, epitomized by the Oberg-Bousquet agreement of August Their paths crossed after fundamental political changes as well as alterations affecting personnel and organization had been made on both the German and French sides in the spring of These involved, on the German side, the exclusion of the military commander from policing matters through the monopolization of jurisdiction by the SS and, on the French side, the return to power of Pierre Laval in April Initial French and German Persecution Measures The anti-Jewish measures introduced on both the French and German sides through ordinances and administrative decisions from the fall of onward represent the first arena.
At first, they did not lead to any more far-reaching organizational measures. Jewish immigrants or their children were profoundly affected by these measures.
The same holds for the Vichy law of 10 September ,11 which adopted an ordinance of the German commander in chief of the army of 20 May for the rear military areas under military administration,12 according to which a provisional administrator administrateur provisoire could be appointed for companies with absentee owners.
The first French measure directed explicitly against the Jews was the annulment on 27 August of the law of 21 April making anti-Semitic propaganda in the press a punishable offense.
Because of the first statute, Jews were excluded from the civil service and the army, from all public offices, from public companies, from teaching at public schools, and from a series of cultural and journalistic professions.
This was connected with a law published a few weeks later, on 22 July , mandating the handover and public administration of Jewish assets.
In the spring of , a further wave of economic decrees followed, subjecting the Jews to strict controls over their property that were implemented by the Vichy authorities.
The ordinances and administrative measures against the Jews primarily served to support strict police controls and restrictions on their mobility, but from May , direct repressive measures primarily targeted against nonFrench Jews were also taken.
Based on the law of 4 October , the French police imprisoned around 3, Jews in Paris on 14 May , deporting them to the Pithiviers and Beaune-la-Rolande detention camps run by French authorities in the occupied zone.
On 20 August , the Paris metropolitan police conducted a large-scale raid, in the course of which 3, Jews, mostly non-French nationals, were arrested based on arrest lists26 and were confined in the Drancy internment camp.
To this must be added internees from the Drancy camp. They formed the first of 79 transports sent to the extermination camps to which around 77, Jews living in France would fall victim.
The first mass murder of Jewish deportees by gassing took place on 19 July , to which of the deportees from the seventh convoy from Drancy fell victim.
The German military administration as well as the Vichy authorities and their police were involved in these persecution measures from the outset.
Congruent objectives functioned as a radicalizing factor in this process as much as did the wrangling over competences. During the first phase of the German occupation until the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June , the government in Vichy pursued an independent and active anti-Semitic policy whose primary goal was the exclusion of the Jews from the economy and public life and from the civil service.
When, following the invasion of the Soviet Union, the occupiers declared communist resistance to be a new security risk, they could also count on the basic willingness of the French police to collaborate in this area.
If an extensive homogeneity of objectives and the collaboration based on a division of labor were already an essential radicalizing factor, the dynamic of escalation was aggravated still further by the competition over competences between the German military administration and the Vichy authorities.
This was made apparent from the outset by the economic persecution measures against the Jews,31 where the Vichy representatives were afraid that the Germans would exert direct influence over French economic life.
The same logic would become apparent, from the spring of onward, in the police repression of the Jews in advance of and during the deportations. They led to the development of procedural routines and the formation of new administrative bodies.
Although a consolidation in this respect was achieved in the area of the economic persecution of the Jews in the summer of , such a consolidation in the area of police repression would not be achieved until the summer of The prompt French initiative and the rapid construction of the SCAP were a result of the determination on the French side to prevent the economic persecution of the Jews from becoming a vehicle of German influence over the French economy.
The institutional relations were considerably more complicated in the area of the police repression of the Jews.
This applied to both the German and the French sides and to the relations between the German and French authorities.
These efforts were not successful when it came to the economic measures against the Jews. The process began with repressive measures by the military administration following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June This event ensured that clearly defined ideological fronts were restored on both the National Socialist and Communist sides.
On 19 August , a German field court-martial passed a death sentence on two young men, Henri Gautherot and Samuel Tyszelman, who had been arrested some days previously.
Both were immediately executed, and the execution was announced throughout the entire Paris municipal area, using particularly conspicuous red or yellow posters.
On the posters announcing the execution of the two young communists, the military administration made explicit that Tyszelman was a Jew.
On 21 August , a member of the German armed forces was attacked for the first time, presumably as a response to the execution of Gautherot and Tyszelman.
A German marine was shot dead by two French attackers in a Paris Metro station. The reaction of Vichy to this new escalation of the German policy of repression was telling.
As early as 23 August , the Vichy interior minister, Pierre Pucheu, passed a law authorizing special courts to impose particularly draconian punishments, including the death penalty, on communist and anarchist offenders.
He [Hitler] could accept the shooting of three hostages only as a first direct measure. At least new hostages must be identified.
At the next assassination attempt, at least shootings must be conducted for each German. It will not be possible to master the situation without such draconian retaliation.
Please submit a telex report on the reasons that were decisive in confining the shootings to three hostages.
The way in which the punishment is administered must heighten the deterrent effect still further. The connection that the OKW directive drew between the conduct of the war against the Soviet Union, communist insurgency, and the military situation as a whole was also perfectly in tune with the interpretations of the occupation authorities.
To this was added the initially strong support for the German repressive measures by the government in Vichy. This support reflected not only the shared anticommunism of the German occupiers and the French government but, above all, the fact that the policy of collaboration pursued by both sides proved to be resilient even under crisis conditions.
Since the OKW directive of 16 September , the viability of the collaboration and hence the basis for virtually all of the ruling practices of the military administration were in abeyance.
On the one hand, the military administration was naturally not in control of the triggering moment for the automatism of attack and reprisal decreed by Hitler and the OKW; on the other hand, there could be no assurance that the distinction the OKH imposed between communists and anarchists, on the one side, and the remainder of the French, on the other, would prove to be effective.
In fact, the relations between the occupying power and Vichy were plunged into a serious crisis at the end of October , after two senior German officials were shot dead by resistance fighters in consecutive attacks on the 20 and 21 October.
The details of these measures were the object of close and intense coordination with both the government in Vichy and the OKW, with Quartermaster General Wagner, who was in charge, receiving detailed directives from Hitler.
Despite this appeal, 50 further hostages were executed by German firing squads on the following day. In the fall of , the mass execution of entirely innocent people was the dominant theme among the French population and, insofar as one could speak of such, the French public.
This development was closely followed by both the government in Vichy and the German occupation administration. But the execution of a further 50 hostages if the perpetrators are not found can have dire consequences.
Its effect was nothing short of catalytic. On the other hand, it led to a consolidation of occupation and institutional policy, an integral component of which was the further radicalization of the persecution of the Jews.
The radicalization of the persecution of the Jews was undoubtedly the work of both of the key control centers of the German occupation regime in France, the specialist departments of the military commander in France and those of the German Embassy in Paris.
Moreover, presumably in the fall of , at the time of the supposed decisive battle before Moscow, German occupation policy in France was ultimately only a peripheral concern of the dictator.
This perception was also the essential common denominator between the German military administration, on the one side, and the government in Vichy, on the other.
Already at the very first signs of an intensification of resistance to the German occupying power following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, however, the military commander and the German Embassy in Paris explicitly made the Jews the target of more severe repressive measures.
The driving force behind the setting of priorities at this time, from the summer of , was not the OKW, the OKH, Hitler himself, or even the RSHA but, instead, the military commander and the German Embassy.
This became apparent for the first time with the raid conducted on 20 August As the collaboration of the Paris police demonstrated, the German side could rely on the fact that the Vichy regime and its leadership would apply an anti-Semitic interpretive framework that reflected its own stereotypes, particularly when measures were directed mainly against foreign Jews, as was the case with this raid.
Here we initially thought of a figure of up to 1, Werner Best. In the process, Knochen exhibited a level of unscrupulousness that was astounding even by the standards of the adept officers of the military administration.
The political repercussions would have been immense if punitive measures had been imposed on Frenchmen and afterwards the true authorship had become known.
Knochen and SS-Ostuf. Sommer, will no longer be employed there. Heydrich responded on 6 November , Because of the exceptional character of the measures to be conducted, the head of my Paris office [thus Knochen] did not inform the military commander.
For, judged by past experience of the collaboration with the military commander, he could scarcely count on meeting with the requisite understanding for the need to conduct these measures in the conflict with ideological opponents.
I also accept full responsibility for this. However, the extremely dramatic events of December would entirely overshadow such skirmishes in an ultimately peripheral matter of occupation administration.
The fifth of December marked the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive that plunged the Wehrmacht, particularly the army and its high command, into its first major crisis since the beginning of the war.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor followed on 7 December, and Germany declared war on the United States on 11 December.
Hitler dismissed the commander in chief of the army, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, on 19 December. Unusually enough, the dictator himself now took over the leadership of the OKH.
I again request that in future the stipulation, nature, and scale of punitive measures should be left to me.
Such a measure is sure to have a powerful effect. Nevertheless, the OKH gave him a clear rebuff. At the same time, this statement revealed the change that the relations between the military commander in France and his superiors in the Wehrmacht had undergone.
He tendered his resignation on 15 February At the same time, however, it was an admission that hardly anything was left of the initial political and administrative general authority of the military commander.
Furthermore, all of the units of the Secret Field Police Geheime Feldpolizei were placed under the command of the HSSPF, and the officials in charge in the military administration were integrated into the Security Police.
A clearer expression of the victory of the SS over the Wehrmacht is hard to imagine. The assumption that the increase in power of the SS and the almost complete translation of the organizational model of the RSHA for the police to the occupied zone led, in themselves, to a radicalization of the German repressive measures would be mistaken.
In particular, he, Heydrich, was of the opinion that the system of hostage executions was out of place in France. Thus, in cases of resistance by the population, it was the foremost task of the HSSPF to establish the identity of the perpetrators and to punish them.
Then this success can also be achieved. Then it will be possible to refrain from hostage executions. The result was a tactical shift in course by the SS leadership in France, which found itself forced to place the impending mass deportations of Jews in the context of the general objectives of the occupation policy.
These two men knew each other well, since they had worked together in the central department of the SD-Hauptamt Secret Services Main Office under Reinhard Heydrich from onward.
In the late s, Hagen, born in , served as director of the Department of Jewish Affairs Judenabteilung in the SDHauptamt, at the center of operations of the persecution of the Jews.
What qualified him for this role was the high level of his intelligence, attested by all postwar witnesses;4 his undoubted expertise in two key domains of SD activity, the persecution of the Jews and foreign espionage; his excellent relations to the two leading figures in these areas in Paris up to that time, Knochen and Dannecker; and, not least, his excellent command of French.
Hitler had personally conferred Iron Crosses First Class on the participants in the SD commando unit including Knochen. Until the beginning of January , he had been director of Gestapo department II B concerned with religious groups, Jews, Freemasons, emigrants, and pacifists in the RSHA.
Among the leading SS personnel in Paris, Lischka was the one with the most practical experience when it came to conducting repressive measures of whatever kind, whether against the Jews or against political opponents of the National Socialist regime or of the German occupying power.
This carried even more weight in view of the fact that his superior, Knochen, had no personal experience in police matters. He came from the same unit within Amt IV of the RSHA as Knochen and Hagen and, having been born in , also belonged to the same age-group.
In , he first became a member of the SS and shortly thereafter joined the NSDAP. Dannecker was evidently an alcoholic.
In , he was reprimanded on disciplinary grounds for drunkenness while on duty and for making false entries in the guard book of the Oranienburg concentration camp.
In other words, the divergences were inconsequential as long as the treatment of the Jews had not become a contentious political issue in relations between the German occupying power and the national authorities and their representatives.
The key figure in the German Embassy was the counselor in the political department, Carltheo Zeitschel. Within the Foreign Service, he was a lateral entrant from the Nazi Party.
Zeitschel, who was born in , was trained as a physician and had been a member of the NSDAP since and hence held the Gold Honor Party Badge Goldenes Parteiabzeichen.
For a brief period in , he was consul in Nigeria, where he narrowly escaped internment by the British. The latter not only could count on the loyal support of the German military administration but also received further, radicalizing impulses following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June and the resulting attacks on Wehrmacht institutions.
The ongoing anti-Jewish laws and ordinances, by contrast, were a matter for the Vichy authorities and the German military administration.
By contrast, the military administration, represented in this instance by Werner Best as head of the Administration Section, made a plea for postponing this measure on the grounds that, following the change in leadership of the Judenkommissariat from Vallat to Darquier de Pellepeoix, the French authorities could be expected to introduce the Star of David badge on their own account.
Following a series of attacks on members of the German Wehrmacht in late April and early May , Knochen, in a conversation with Abetz, secured the consent of the embassy to the immediate introduction of the Star of David badge in the occupied territories, which Zeitschel promptly communicated to Dannecker by telephone on 4 May It was transformed into a compromise that shattered the dreams cherished in the meantime by both Dannecker and Eichmann, and as a matter of occupation policy, it was made contingent on the consent of the government in Vichy.
The compliance of the military administration and the embassy with the planned introduction of the Star of David badge on 7 June was the final process in which the rivalry between the Wehrmacht and the SS still played a certain role in the implementation of the persecution measures.
With the appointment of the HSSPF, these tensions were a thing of the past, at least when it came to the repressive measures in general and the persecution of the Jews in particular.
At the operative level, the preparations for the deportation of the Jews were transposed to a new dimension, but at the political level, the fundamental question of the effectiveness of the French police organization and the reliability of the collaboration relations between the relevant German and French authorities was placed on the agenda.
Heydrich had a clear perception of the dilemma of the occupation policy of, on the one hand, having to supervise the domestic security apparatus while, on the other, having only limited personnel resources at its disposal for this task.
In particular, he, Heydrich, was of the opinion that the system of hostage executions was misplaced in France.
It amounted to an admission of failure on the part of the police. Thus the foremost task of the HSSPF in cases of resistance by the population was to establish the identity of the perpetrators and to inflict the punishment.
He had to succeed in securing the involvement of the French police and then this success would also be achievable. Actor Constellation and Strategic and Tactical Dispositions on the French Side Among the framework conditions for implementing the decisions of the Wannsee Conference in France was a complete overhaul of personnel, which had occurred in the first half of in the relevant authorities on both sides, the French as well as the German.
The changes on the French side were even more sweeping. On 18 April , Pierre Laval returned to power as head of government Chef du gouvernement , a position newly created for him.
On the German side, however, there could not be any question of a coherent policy toward France, with regard either to the linkage between strategic and tactical initiatives or to the coordination among the relevant actors.
Good relations to Vichy had value for Hitler himself and for the High Command of the Armed Forces Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW only as long and insofar as they were conducive to the German military objectives.
Among these objectives in and was, besides ensuring political and police security in the rear area, a possible military contribution by France to the conduct of the war against Great Britain in the Mediterranean.
Darlan was prepared to support the side that, in his estimation, had the better chances of victory. In , this was, to all appearances, the Axis powers.
Therefore, Darlan strove to achieve a series of concrete military agreements with Germany as well as to conclude a peace settlement before the end of military conflict with Great Britain that would presumably end in a victory for the Axis powers.
The envisaged settlement included rigorous measures against not only British but also German encroachments on French possessions and mandates in the Mediterranean region.
This meeting turned on reaching an understanding between the German and French sides to the effect that France would provide the Germans with logistical support and military infrastructure in North Africa.
In return, France expected the German side to make concessions toward reducing the costs of the occupation, accelerating the release of its prisoners of war, and attenuating the inspection regime at the line of demarcation between the occupied and unoccupied parts of the French mainland, together with a number of further, more minor improvements in the situation of the French armed forces.
However, this did not prevent the men in the second and third tiers on both sides from repeatedly sounding out the room for maneuver in collaboration policy and from reaching concrete agreements in particular cases.
This remained valid, at any rate, for the years and , when both French support in securing the German flanks in the Mediterranean region and a resulting tactical deference to the domestic and foreign political constraints under which the government in Vichy operated had not yet lost their importance.
The same event that markedly weakened the interest of the German leadership in consolidating relations with France, the invasion of the Soviet Union, mobilized new support for Germany in Vichy, in the spirit of the joint combat against Bolshevism.
The military and logistical concessions to Germany had, for the present, only led to the loss of the Syrian mandate territories, while substantive reciprocal measures from the German side had failed to materialize.
The meeting brought no results for the French side, whereas the German side at least provisionally secured replenishment deliveries to the Africa Corps through Tunis.
He nevertheless remained commander in chief of the French armed forces even after his dismissal. This appointment signaled a tactical reversal on the French side.
Laval had no truck with the geopolitical ambitions of his predecessor. He was content to make declarations of loyalty to the presumptive future hegemonic power Germany, yet from this supposedly stable basis, he worked tenaciously to exact concessions from the German side in numerous detailed matters of French domestic policy.
The Franco-German police agreement of 8 August would assume central importance in this regard. Laval had been one of the most accomplished politicians of the Third Republic31 and had already been a symbol of the collaboration during his period in office as vice president of the Council of Ministers, which had ended abruptly on 13 December As such, he was again the man of the hour.
He was optimally equipped to achieve this at the institutional level, because along with his appointment as head of government, he had secured for himself the ministries of the interior, foreign affairs, and information.
Bousquet was not yet 33 years old at the time of his appointment as head of all of the French police forces. When it came to his age, his career, and his habitus, he closely resembled his partners on the German side, particularly Knochen and Hagen.
That disposition met with respect on the side of the SS. This was precisely the line endorsed by Heydrich during his visit to Paris in May In France, this convergence of interests found its outstanding exponents in Bousquet, on the one side, and Oberg and Knochen, on the other.
Police Reform and Collaboration Policy In the police reform that he immediately set about realizing, Bousquet faced quite exceptional challenges, because the already deeply fragmented French police organization had undergone additional, politically motivated differentiations since May under the previous interior minister, Pierre Pucheu.
A reform had been carried out in principle as early as April , also under Pucheu, when overall authority for all police forces was conferred on the newly installed regional prefects.
Under a police director adjunct to the regional prefect, three commissaires divisionaires had responsibility for the constabulary, the criminal police, and the domestic intelligence service.
As a result, Bousquet was at the head of the bulk of the armed forces that remained under French control on the mainland under the terms of the armistice agreement.
In September , responsibility for the prison administrations was likewise concentrated in the Ministry of the Interior. The specific purpose of the GMR was to combat possible domestic riots.
Along with the militia see below , the GMR proved to be a particularly brutal opponent of the resistance from onward. However, frictions arose when the internal contradictions within the Vichy regime and the political and social forces that supported it, on the one hand, and the contradictory expectations and demands of the German occupying power, on the other, affected the organization of the police.
Bousquet was determined to carry out the disbanding of the PQJ, which duly occurred on 5 July , just before the deportations began.
It was explicitly intended to satisfy Darquier and to ensure the continued availability of the personnel of the former PQJ to assist in monitoring the observance of the anti-Jewish laws and ordinances and their implementation.
The gradual establishment of the later notorious Milice, likewise a product of the internal contradictions of the Vichy regime, represented an even more significant dilution of the police monopoly of the state.
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